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Honorable Dane H. Watkins, District Judge, presiding

Stephen D. Hall and Nathan M. Olsen
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6

Phase Investments

This case arises out of the same series of transactions described in
1'.

Jarvis. 153 Idaho 207. 280

710 (2012), in \vh1ch this Court held that a deed not signed by
~

both spouses was potentially voidable, but not void. under Idaho

this case. the

32-912.

lender. Snake River Funding, Inc., and its assignee, DAFCO LLC (collectively "the Lenders") sued
(collectively "the Title Companies") claiming

Stewart Title Guaranty Company and Amerititle.
damages from

the title policy and against Amerititle

Title resulti ng

also sought to add claims for neglIgence

resulting from breaches of the escrow agreement.
and for breach of the duty of good faith and

t~lir

Companies, and to add a

dealing against the

breach of warranty claim against Snake River Funding under its assignment.

January] 5,

the Lenders

their

cause. l (Shortly thereafter the

this

investments. supra. was commenced.
on

filed a

complaint against

201

3

clari fying

claims against

Stewart Guaranty.
judgment 4

21,
by the trial court in January

It on the grounds that, although the trial court in

\vas denied

Phase

JnrestmenlS had invalidated the Jarvis' s deed because it had not been signed by both spouses,

1

R, p. 12.

See Supreme Court Repository, Bonneville County Case CV -2010-651.
R, p. 22.
4

R, p. 93.

7

\vas still pending 5

the

that

claims \vere not

court determined that the

the

pending a

court
11, it vacated all

and on

refused to dismiss the case, as requested
hearing and

the

Investments .Ii

appeal

on

In the meantime, the Lenders filed a Second Amended Complaint on March] 1.2011, adding
a claim against Amerititle, Inc which had aeted as the esero\v agent in the closing of the loan by the
7

to

case

the

comi

answer to the

amended

was

complaint \vas

the outcome

of the
that
111

interest

2L

by Substitution
had

substitution

'JLLUH•••)

at a status

on

pp. 357, 368-369.
6

a conflict

. counsel

pp. 460-461.

7

R., p. 426.

8

R .. p. Il.
..

9

Tr., p. 22, L. 19

p.

L. 6: p.

L1. 9-24.

10

R., p. 464,466; Tr., p. 18, Lt. 14-21.

II

Tr., p. 23, LL 5-6.
8

taken on the new claims and

starting at ground zero

to

a

Title and Amerititle moved
to file a Third

201

judgment October 1
6,

Complaint

and

2012. 13

12. J4

These motions. along with ancillary motions to strike and to continue. were argued
December 1

201

At the heanng the trial court, considering all of the briefs and affidavits. ruled

It granted both motions for summary judgment and denied the plaintiff's motion to

the

J<

to

were

42 days later on February 4,

appeal

13, when

December
filed

2012.16
Notice of

J7

The

this Court's opinion in New Phase

to this dispute is most

Joshua and Rebecca
were
on June 30, 2006, and remained
married throughout the proceedings belmv. Joshua acquired a piece real property
in
Is (the "Property") on
7,
. Although the warranty deed
conveyed the Property to Joshua as married man dealing with his
and separate
property," the parties do not dispute that it vvas community property. Joshua planned
to build a spec home on the Property and, in furtherance of that end, obtained several
construction
usmg the Property as
On March 1 2008, Joshua executed a deed of trust in favor of Snake River
Funding.
to secure the amount of$268.000, and that deed was later assigned to
DAFCO, LLC The deed of trust was recorded in Bonneville County on March 18.

12

R .. pp. 468, 580.

l'

R, pp. 471. 473

14

R.. , p.)-8'.:...

J5

pp.42-93

J6

R., pp. 689-693.

17

R.. p. 694 .

9

2008. It is undisputed
did not join in the execution of this first-recorded
trust deed. On April 3, 2008, Joshua obtained a $42,000 loan secured by another
trust
of
Phase Investments,
again without
Rebecca's signature.
Although Joshua defaulted on those obligations in the summer of2008,
Phase agreed to loan him additional money secured by neVi deeds of trust. Joshua
and Rebecca, acting together, executed two deeds of trust in favor ofNe\v Phase on
October 28,2008, as well as a third deed of trust on November 3,2008. The trust
deeds secured amounts of $42,000, $63,600, and $140,000, respectively, and \vere
recorded in Bonneville County on their dates of execution. 18
Amerititle \vas the escrow agent that closed the loan transaction between Jarvis and Snake
Funding. 19

transaction involved several issues, as set forth

the closing instructions

prepared by Amerititlc. First. Amerititle recognized in the closing instructions that the closing would
involve two steps. The first step was to execute the documents that created a loan from Snake River
Funding to l\1r. Jarvis. The second step was to execute the documents that assigned Snake River
Funding's interest in the loan to
in interest in this
from Snake

In other \vords, from the outset DAFCO was the real party

closing. That was patently obvious to all. The Closing Instructions
Funding and

to Amerititle state: "Please prepare the: Promissory Note, Deed

Inc. to

C

documents.·,2 o
to the

the parties to the transaction, the Closing Instructions

followed the Commitment for Title Insurance issued by Amerititle. In particular, the Commitment
for Title Insurance issued prior to Closing provided that title \vas vested in "Josh M. Jarvis. a married
man dealing with his sole and separate property.',21 The same Commitment for Title Insurance

18

New Phase Investments v. Jarvis, 153 Idaho at 208-209,280 P.3d at 711-712

19 R .. p. 502, ~ 9 (AtTidavit of Megan Ker).
20

R., p. 508 (Exhibit A to AtTidavit of Megan Ker)

21 R., p. 434 ~ 4 (Exhibit A to verified Second Amended Complaint)
10

vestee

hereinjoin

one of the

necessary

to

m

Community iJrl,nc','n presumption.,·n Presumably, this \vouldhave
documents" referenced in the Closing lnstructions, as set forth

Under the Closing Instructions, Amerititle was not authorized to close the transaction until
it "has received all properly executed documents.

"23

The parties were entitled to assume that the

properly executed documents \vouJd include the signature

on the conveyance or

as set out
At the closing,

Amerititle did not obtain the signature

Mrs. Jarvis, either on the

of Trust or on another instrument in vvhich she disclaiming any interest in the property. Indeed,
that failure \vas at the heart

Phase investments, as it is in this case.

the litigation in

In short. Ameritile was the escrow or
showing that title \vas

improperly prepared documents

in Joshua

community property. 11 prepared
prepared the closing'

deed

trust

and

of as .

mcluding a

Jarvis. It

and

to the parties to sign

at the closing of the

in question.

as is ubiquitous in such transactions, the parties relied on

Amerititle, as the

that

"vr,?W'f

was nel:;es,sa! to

the title and

the documents right at closing so that the loan could be insured without any cloud or encumbrance
other than those listed on the title commitment and, ultimately, on the title insurance policy. Those
failures led to the deed of trust being voidable and thus potentially voicL which allowed New Phase

Investments to feel secure in taking subsequently executed and recorded deeds of trust and asserting
a first priority lien.

22

R., p. 435 (Exhibit A to verified Second Amended Complaint)

)'

--' R., p. 509, L. 1 (Exhibit A to Affidavit of Megan Ker)

11

as

was

a

as
The title

title

followed the state

"pr"yrrprI

m

Commitment for

defines "'Insured" not

Notably, the

to

corporation," (the insured listed in Schedule
mdebtedness. ,,25 Onder this provision
IS

an insured

Amerititle.
an Idaho

but also " ... each succcssor

ownership of the

as a successor ovmer of the indebtedness from Jarvis,

the

As

on the

summer

due and payable under the
and his \\ife to

(closed, it should be

26

to

Phasc Investments

), a straightforward f(.)reclosure was not possible. Rather

forec lose on a

pursuant to

general understanding

to
nC)'pmpnl

under the policy.

3 ,

on

23,

Inc., both testified that they never
or

to

represent their interests in

24
25

26

other way. Instead.

interests

consistently requested that Stc\vart Title pay

pp. 438-450 (Exhibit B to verified Second Amended Complaint), p. 429
R, p. 447,

~

l(e)( 1

(Exhibit B to verified Second Amended Complaint)

R., p. 342, ~ 7 (Affidavit of David Patterson)

27R .,

'°1'')')
p. 4'101ll')4'fR
,1 , II"" ,c.
., p.)'10,r;16
L., Ii
), an d pp.)L.
-)~_).

21)

p. 430,

~

25.

12

trust or to

18-19

they

the

as

In

Instead

, Stevvmt Title retained counsel to represent

under the

Funding in an effort to remedy or "establish" the title. The Policy gives

and Snake

Stewart Title the right. in addition to the options contained in paragraph 7 set out below, to institute
or the lien of the Insured MOltgage. as insured." including

and pursue action to "establish the

judgment or order.,·30

the right to appeal
to
to

paragraph 7, Stewart Title also is given
., to "Purchase the Indebtedness, or

or
the

or

other provision

that deals

Despite the

hiring

the Insured. J 1 There appears to be no

other

the interaction of these several different options.
Title, for various reasons, including two

counsel by
the

bankruptci es'
10.

tiling

years. resulting in a delay

litigation occupied

was not initiated

shortly after

from the

Claim. That

approximately

after Jarvis's

s errors at

default to
During that four

continued to accrue on the note. Instead of having a relatively
12

times the interest accrued,

long, and 12

eroding the relati ve value ofthe security for the loan. Moreover,

as is well known to virtually every adult in this country, during that time period from mid-2008 until
mid-2012, the real estate market nationwide. especially the residential real estate market took a
serious beating, also dramatically reducing the value

's security.

29

R., pp. 341-342, 343A (AfIidavit of David Patterson, Affidavit of Darin Hebdon (Second)

30

R .. p. 448,

31

~

5(b)(c)

R., p. 448, ~ 7(a)(b)

13

to
so

court

an amendment to restate claims against Amerititle and

inrestments decision because of the age of the case. Did the

Title in light the

court abuse its discretion when it was necessary to wait for the decision in

Phase Investments

before proceeding?
Idaho

a court to deny

faith claims.

asserted
"\

negligence and bad faith claims against the
discretion

denying leave to amend on the ground that

merit?

The covenant

.J.

amend a complaint w·hen the amended
negligence claims against

not set out a

the trial court abuse

to

fair dealing is part of insurance contracts in

see that

Stewart

10

its damages under the policy. allowing

a
and
3.

not

but

beneficiaries. The Closing Instructions between Snake River Funding and Amerititle
contemplated an immediate assignment of the loan to

which actually occurred. Was it

improper to deny summary judgment to DAFCO against Amerititle for lack of privity?

seeks its attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 1 120(3) (commercial
transaction).

14

In Hines v. Hines. 129 Idaho 847. 853. 934
Court explained the long-standing rules

20. 27 (Idaho 1997) the Idaho Surpeme

the Court regarding decisions to grant or to refuse

permission to amend a complaint It stated:
the decision to grant or refuse permission to amend a complaint is left to
sound
discretion of the trial court when a party proposes to amend its complaint after a
responsive pleading is served. l.R.c.P. 15(a): Jones v. Watson, 98 Idaho 606. 570
P.2d 284 (1977). \Ve also recognize that this Court has determined that a trial court
properly refuses permission to amend a complaint \vhen the record contains no
allegations that, ifproven. would entitle
party to the relief claimed.
Racquetball Club. Inc. v. Idaho First Naf'! Bank, 119 Idaho 17]. 804 P.2d
(1991). Nonetheless, as this Court indicated in lFickstrom v. North Idaho
111 Idah0450,725P
155(1
inthemterest'
t~tvor liberal grants of leave to amend a complaint.
,\Vhen reyiewing an exercise of discretion, a court on appeal conducts a three-tiered inquiry.
The lower court must have (I)
outer boundaries of its discretion
ayailabJe to it, and

the issue as one of discretion,

\\'ithin the

consistently with legal standards applicable to specific choices

) reached its conclusion

an exerCIse

reason. Dunagan v. Dunagan, 147

Idaho 599, 213 P.3d 384 (2009).
Regarding the second
in Hines v. Hines,

of the inquiry, some of the legal standards applicable are set forth
most basic of these legal standards is that district courts should favor

liberal grants of leave to amend a complaint. Hines, supra. This requirement is set forth explicitly
in LR.C.P. J 5(a) as follows: "[L ]eave shall be freely given when justice so requires."

15

ruling on the motions before it at the hearing held

m

emphasized how long this case had been pending. and

the

1

concern about the time

guidelines imposed on trial courts by the Supreme Court.
So there's an extended history on this case, and it appears that the parties in
some regard may have been idle mvaiting the decision. but nonetheless this is a case
that has been pending since 2010 early. And so when we reach triaL it will have been
a number of years, \vhich far exceeds the time standards that are imposed upon this
Court for resolution. And there are those cases that have taken this kind of time. but
at the nature
cases to
a
as to \vhether or not it
diligently pursued.
. p. 77,

9.

The
calendar and
, p.

its viev, and the pressures it feels from its case management and
guidelines set forth by the Supreme Court that it can't go backwards.

.]

on
udicial to
this case
The
an amendment,

. it appears on nothing else, the trial court
the complaint.
to

the

the Court finds that

that it
m

p.

never states vvhat the prejudice to the defendants actually would be if there were
amount of time. The court was obviously conc'~rnleu with

additional delay, but it never discussed how short or how long the delay would be, or what the
practical or legal consequences of that delay would be on the defendants. The trial court mentions
the New Phase Investment case and the need to wait for a decision, but once that decision was made,
was unwilling to discount the time lost during that wait and was unwilling to even consider the effect
that decision had on the posture of this case.
Remarkably, the trial court was willing to allow Stewart Title a period of four years to sort
out the title to the property, finding that it had proceeded "diligently," even though the prejudice to

]6

as interest on

of

note

and

y-,r,H",PrTV

values

it was um,illing to

same
of interest

conflict
to put its claims in line \vith the new legal realities

its prior counseL even a short
s surpnsmg

after the

111

Phase Invcstmel1ls.

The failure to address the specific prejudice to be experienced by Amerititle (which did not
even file an answer to the Second Amended Complaint until after the decision in New Phase
) or to

was a

of

third tier of the inquiry conducted by this
court seems to

to the

the applIcation

court

cases, not on the

the prejudice

the Supreme Court guidelines on the resolution of

or interests of justice

parties.

are

the
and perhaps
that
the
court

new

Still, though, the court said that the claims had, in essence, no legal merit. This confusion, failure
to address the merits of the new claims themselves instead of the claims set forth in the second
amended complaint is also a violation of the third tier of inquiry under the abuse of discretion
standard. which requires that the result be reached as a result of an exercise of reason.
The claims pending under the Second Amended Complaint, which were the subject of the
summary judgment motions, were purely contractual claims under the Policy (against Stewart Title)
and the Closing Instructions (against Amerititle). In contrast, the claims to be added under the

17

v;ere: (1 a
se,

in the manner that it

and the Lenders:

negligence and for bad faith (both tort claims) arising from the

manner in \vhich Stewart Title responded to and handled the claim filed by

under the

Policy: and (3) a claim for breach of warranty against Snake River Funding.
(Snake

Funding did not even appear at the hearing, presumably because the hearing

scheduled on the motion to amend \vas scheduled for the follO\ving \vcck. The trial court, without
including
considered it together
any

hearing of the motion to amend and
the motions

summary Judgment.)

there is good authority for all of the claims

sought to add against the

defendants.

Title Have Legal Merit.
negligence and
regulations that

a

a cause

establish the first two elements
that,

are not precluded from bringing a private cause of

administrative
on

to be established by showing

set

statutes and

even gomgso

m

as to state

that the "statutory scheme to regulate the insurance industry fails to provide sufficient incentive"
alone to prevent \'VTongs, therefore allowing private claims to be based on such statutes (such as bad
faith or negligence.

() 'C;uin v. Bingham County, 142 Idaho 49, 52 122 P.3d 308, 311 (2005).
" VVhite v. Unigard iHut. Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 94. fn 3730 P.2d 1014,
18

fn 3 (1986)

in nature. and that in

are
an escrov,;

for

IS

to these

common law duties, there are statutory and regulatory duties as set forth
Idaho Escrow

to

escrow agents

and for companies governed under the Idaho Department

the
and

those statutes 36 and the related regulations. 37 In addition. in Idaho. the statutes and regulations
regarding insurance are incorporated into and/or are to be consistent \vith the agreements with the
insured. 38
The
in the setting forth

duties
ms of negligence and per se negligence as it pertained to Amerititle's and

Stewmi Title's conduct as

title insurance and escrow

those role,

statutes and regulations governing escro\v

Amerititle and Stewart Title had a duty 10 comply
duties and the issuance

111

including regulations issued

the Idaho Department
se.

violated include failing to conduct
to

to

proper execution, ackno\vledgmenL

34

See All American ReallY at 1357-58,

35

Idaho Code § 30-901 et seq.

36

Idaho Code §41-101et

37

IDAPA 18.01.25

mortgage papers, and other

1.

38

See, e.g., Hansen v. State Farm A1ut. Auto. Ins. Co., 735 P.2d 974.980-81 (Idaho
1987) ; Hovvard v. Blue Cross of Idaho Health Service. Inc., 757 P.2d 1204, 1207 (Idaho App.
1987). H(~ffman v. SV Co., 628 P.2d 218,221 (Idaho 1981).

19

instruments

lssuance

to

a

a

4()

These claims
obtaining

its o\'vn

to

Title failed to ensure

s

the documents had been properly
2.

instructions by

prior to issul11g a policy

The Breach of Warranty ('lainl against 5'nake River Funding Has Legal /vferit

conflict

interest

to the

counsel, ,"vas a

plaintiff's initial.

to
HI

s interest in the

to

it agreed to indemnify

harmless against

threats to

. 1t is undisputed that

Corporate

s il1terest in the
cl

merit,
to recuse himself.
was
\vas

t\\:o parties had
an

resolved. separate

to

received from prior counsel.
The trial court erred in not even addressing this particular claim \vhatsoever in his ruling
denying DAFCO's motion to amend the complaint. It is apparent from the record that the court was
anxious to

this case v"ithout

39

IDAPA 18.01.25.005.C)1.d

40

IDAPA 18.01

.011.01

further deliberations or proceedings, and notwithstanding

the

Funding's

\vas not

to

on

ILA"au:,,__

the hearing

one

Faith and

The Breach of the
Claim have ;\1erit

3.

at

Dealing Contractual and Tort

DAFCO's Second Amended Complaint included claims for breach of contract against both
Amerititle (
the

the Escro\v Agreement) and Stewart Title (under the title policy). Howevec after
Court issued

Phase Invcstments, a bad faith tort claim against

under

also became ripe,

the basis

adding such claim to

Third

Complaint.
Title

contracts

are

treated as such under

insured and their insurers" and should

41

that is governed by the insurance statutes

regulations, \vhich make it subject to the strict
relationship

"the

the 1I1surer and
faith claim, or breach

type
yiolation

can

44

f~ljr

IS

a

the

contract damages.n
that exists bet\veen
an 1I1surer \vere

out

bad faith claim lies against an msurer

unreasonably denies or \vithholds payment:
failure to pay is not the result of a good
compensable by contract damages.

insurer and

v.

Alut

111surer intentionallv and

the claim is not fairly debatable; 3) the denial or

f~J.ith

mistake: and 4) the resulting harm is not fully

insurer's failure to timely respond to and defend its insured

4c

Boel v. Stewart Title Guar.
Whitc v. UniganI Ahll. Ins.

43

Id.

44

13 7 Idaho 173, 176 (Idaho 2002)

41

faith and

covenant

or

Ins.

requirements, that is, the "special
ofwhich gi ves rise to a bad

111

claim

interpreted

,]

Idaho

112 Idaho

21

11-1

43 P.3d 768, 773 (2002)

730 P.2d 10]4 (1986)

IS

t~lith

a

in the

the standards set
can

Settlement

serve as a basis for bad faith.47

among other things:
"failing to acknuwledge and act reasonably promptly upon communications \vith
respect to claims arising under insurance policies;"

Sec. (2)

"not attempting in good faith to etlectuate prompt, fair and equitable settlements of
ms 111 which liability has become reasonably clear;" Id. at

has become reasonably clear, under

to
one portion

and
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The Idaho Supreme Court quite recently reiterated the oft-cited standards to be applied on
appeal of an order granting summary judgment to the moving party.
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is proper if "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the
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the movmg party is entitled to a judgment as a matter law. ,applying this standard. this Court construes disputed facts "in favor of the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are drawn
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